Kelly's Ford VA029

supportedunresolved Fitz Lee says his first intimation came by telegram from army headquarters at 11 a.m. on the 16th, that scouts reported the enemy at Morrisville, that the report of the attack at the ford never reached him, and that he first learned at 7.30 a.m. that the enemy had crossed. Averell says his orders came with reports of Confederate cavalry near Brentsville, that his request for a regiment at Catlett's Station was refused, and that prisoners later reported Fitz Lee reinforced and Stuart present.

Attributed knowledge in both commanders' after-action reports; no inspected message log. Local clocks conflict and are not synchronized: Fitz Lee says the attack on his picket commenced about 5 a.m. and news of the crossing reached him at 7.30 a.m., while Averell says his column reached the ford at 8 a.m. and crossed after half an hour of attempts. Neither timetable is adopted.

supportedunresolved Averell says the battery joined after a 32-mile march with horses in poor condition, that ammunition was carried across the ford in nose-bags, that his artillery ammunition was of miserable quality and nearly exhausted with unreliable fuses, and that his horses were very much exhausted by evening. Fitz Lee says his brigade was weakened by four squadrons on picket and by many horses unfit after the winter with very limited forage.

Equipment and remount statements from two opposing commanders' reports; no ordnance or quartermaster return inspected.

supportedunresolved Averell says his orders were to cross the Rappahannock and attack and rout or destroy Fitz Lee's cavalry near Culpeper Court-House. Fitz Lee's general orders attribute to the enemy a purpose to penetrate the interior and destroy railroads.

Averell reports his own orders; Fitz Lee's statement of Union purpose is an opponent's attribution. No inspected order text.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Inconclusive and the live result Indecisive. NPS says the Union forces withdrew in mid-afternoon after a localized success. Averell says he decided to withdraw at 5.30 p.m. and recrossed without losing a man, the enemy making no demonstration worthy of notice. Fitz Lee says the enemy advanced 2 miles from the ford and was driven back, recrossing about 7.30 p.m. with his brigade in close pursuit.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The timing and character of the withdrawal differ among the accounts; none is adopted.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 200 total; the live NPS field reads 179 total (US 99; CS 80;). Averell gives his aggregate killed, wounded and missing as 80, which the compiler footnotes against a revised statement on p.53; he counts 2 officers and 68 men killed and seriously wounded left on the field and, if twice as many slightly wounded escaped, reckons Confederate killed and wounded at over 200, which he says may be an overestimate; he puts prisoners at 47, with 15 more reported but unaccounted for. Fitz Lee gives his own loss as 11 killed, 88 wounded and 34 taken prisoner, 133 in all, and says he captured 29 prisoners. The live side split matches Averell's 80 and Fitz Lee's 99 killed and wounded with the sides reversed (a computation here).

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The live split is not adopted; the revised Union statement was not inspected. The OCR of Fitz Lee's recapitulation inclosure (parent or25-1-illinois-ocr-v1, not selected) prints the men's columns as 11, 77, 33 and 133, which do not sum to 133 and differ from the report's 88 wounded and 34 prisoners; the table layout was not checked against print, so no reading is adopted.

supportedunresolved Averell says two of his regiments wavered at first, that Duffié's charge came three minutes too soon without prearranged support, and that at 5.30 p.m. he deemed it proper to withdraw rather than attack the entrenched position. Fitz Lee credits Stuart, who joined before the fight and was on the field all day, and notes that Colonel Munford missed most of the action at a court-martial. NPS says Pelham was killed. The live heading ranks Fitz Lee Major General against the frozen Brigadier General and his own signature.

Stuart was present but is not a frozen commander; the frozen commanders Averell and Fitz Lee do not receive automatic sole credit. The heading rank is not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength); the frozen battle-level 3,000 total has no side split. No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads Divisions (3,000 total) with a frozen strength of 3000; the live field reads zero. NPS gives Averell twenty-one hundred troopers and Fitz Lee a brigade of about 800. Averell says he was directed to take 3,000 cavalry and six guns, detached about 900 to guard the fords, and set out with about 2,100 men (775, 563 and 760 by brigade) and a battery. Fitz Lee puts the enemy at certainly not less than 3,000 mounted men with a battery, and gives no count of his own brigade.

Ordered, detached, marching and opponent-estimated figures differ in scope; none is adopted as matched opening strength. The frozen 3,000 numerically equals the ordered and Confederate-estimated Union figures; the frozen field gives no side split and its population basis is not established. Live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Averell says the ford was obstructed by abatis on both banks, defended by 80 sharpshooters in rifle-pits and houses, with a rapid current about 4 feet 5 inches deep; a deep ditch and heavy stone wall in front of the first wood impeded cavalry, marshy ground blocked the left, and the Confederate guns in the last position appeared covered by earthworks. Fitz Lee calls the Union position very strong, sheltered by woods and a long, high stone fence, and later asks that 'perpendicular' be replaced by 'at right angles'.

Obstacles described by both commanders; who built the ford defenses and when is not established beyond Fitz Lee's night reinforcement of the picket. No map verification or numerical terrain effect.