Spotsylvania Court House VA048

supportedunresolved Humphreys says it was apprehended that local people would inform Lee of the move, that prisoners identified Kershaw's troops at Laurel Hill, that the Union withdrawal from the right was not discovered until the afternoon of the 14th, and that Lee sent Ewell on the 19th to learn whether the army was moving to his right.

Attributed knowledge from an interested history; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Meade says moving the trains by daylight on May 7 undoubtedly gave notice to the enemy, and that from May 15 to 17 a base was established at Aquia Creek for the sick and wounded and for supplies. Humphreys says railroad communication with Aquia Creek was completed on May 22 and that the reserve artillery's ninety-two guns were sent to Washington on May 19.

Movement and supply statements; no transport or supply return inspected.

supportedunresolved Meade says that, the enemy's left being well guarded, an attack on his center at a salient was arranged for May 12. Humphreys argues that Lee could not withdraw from the salient in daylight without risk of disaster, and says the movement by the left was adopted afterward to attack Lee's right before it was reinforced.

Stated aims from an interested report and history.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Inconclusive (Grant continued his offensive); the live result reads Indecisive. Meade says the May 12 assault took Johnson and Steuart with over 3,000 prisoners and 20 guns; Humphreys relays Hancock's nearly 4,000 prisoners and twenty guns. Meade says the enemy retired to an inner line on the 13th; NPS says Grant disengaged on May 21 and continued toward Richmond.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. Meade's and Hancock's prisoner counts differ and are not reconciled.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 30,000 (US 18,000; CS 12,000); the live field reads 27,000 (US 18,000; CS 9,000). Humphreys gives the Army of the Potomac, May 8–19, 1,411 missing and 14,679 total, and with Burnside's figures 15,722 killed and wounded, 2,001 missing and 17,723 in all; he reports Badeau's 13,601 and says Badeau's wounded are too few. He has no accurate Confederate account, puts their May 12 loss at between 9,000 and 10,000, and relays Ewell's about 900 at Harris Farm.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Humphreys' Army of the Potomac totals run from the morning of May 8 to the night of May 19; the selected passage does not say whether the Cavalry Corps' raid losses (VA052, inside this interval) are included, so the two records must not be added. His Confederate figure is an inference.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Grant decided to continue the movement by the left and directed Meade's dispositions, that Meade stopped the May 18 attack when told it had little chance, and, in a footnote, that at about eleven o'clock on the night march begun the evening of May 7 the head of Warren's column was halted and seriously delayed by the Provost-Marshal-General's mounted troops occupying the road, while Warren stayed near the Lacy house overseeing the withdrawal, 'the most important part of his duty'; had he been at the head of the column, Humphreys adds, he would have reported the obstruction at once. Meade says the Second Corps carried the salient on the 12th. The frozen commanders are Grant, Meade and Lee; the live page lists Grant and 'Major General Robert Lee'.

Direction is attributed as the sources state; Humphreys treats Warren's location as a duty and the mounted troops as the obstruction, not Warren as at fault. The live rank for Lee is not adopted. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen and live force fields read 152,000 (US 100,000; CS 52,000). Humphreys relays Early's statement that Hill's corps had about 13,000 muskets for duty when he took command on May 8, Ewell's that his corps barely numbered 8,000 after losing Johnson's division on the 12th, and Ewell's 6,000 at Harris Farm on the 19th. For Union reinforcements he gives Hancock's 8,000 with Tyler, a regiment of 1,500, and an effective force sent between May 4 and June 12 of probably about 12,000; Upton's brigade was 'now only 800 strong' on the 14th.

Partial, secondhand figures for different dates, formations and populations; reinforcements are not opening strength. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Humphreys describes Lee's line forming a salient projecting a mile north and half a mile wide, the eastern half or more of it covered by wood, says much the greater part of Lee's intrenchments was concealed by wood, and argues such intrenchments more than quadrupled a defender's strength if well manned; Warren reported dense woods slowing the approach on May 8. Meade says Barlow and Gibbon found the enemy strongly posted and guarded by the Ny on May 10.

Works built during the operations; not tagged as inherited. Humphreys' multiplier is his judgment, not a measure.