North Anna VA055

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Union maps were erroneous, especially near the North Anna, that Lee was probably still under the belief the army was moving east of the Mattapony, that Hill's corps was learned to be near at Jericho Mills, and that Wilson's demonstration gave Lee the intended impression of a move by the right.

Attributed knowledge from an interested history; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Lee moved to cover the Virginia Central Railroad, which connected Richmond with the most fertile parts of Virginia, that a ponton bridge was laid at Jericho Mills, and that parts of both railroads were broken up on May 25 and 26.

Movement and destruction statements from an interested history; no supply return inspected.

supportedunresolved Humphreys relays Venable's statement that Lee hoped to strike at the North Anna, and argues Lee could afford to attack only by surprise; NPS says Lee hoped to strike but was ill. Humphreys says the strength of Lee's position led to continuing the movement by the left flank.

Stated or inferred aims from an interested history and a summary; Lee's illness is from NPS only.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Inconclusive and the live result Indecisive. Humphreys says Hill's attack on Warren at Jericho Mills was repulsed with considerable loss, especially in prisoners; NPS says Grant withdrew both wings once the threat of Lee's position was revealed, and outflanked it downstream.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 4,000 total; the live field reads 5,140 (US 2,623; CS 2,517). Humphreys gives the medical director's 2,100 Army of the Potomac wounded for May 21–26, and the Medical and Surgical History's 223 killed, 1,460 wounded and 290 missing for May 23–27, preferring the former; he says the Jericho Mills killed and wounded were probably equal on both sides.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Humphreys' two Union figures cover different dates and categories.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Meade, with Grant's sanction, directed Warren to cross at Jericho Mills, and that Hancock directed Birney's attack on the bridge-head works; Meade says Birney carried the works and saved the Telegraph road bridge. The frozen commanders are Grant, Meade and Lee; the live page lists Grant and 'Major General Robert Lee'.

Direction is attributed as the sources state; no listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads Armies and the live field zero. Humphreys lists reinforcements reaching Lee at Hanover Junction: Hoke's brigade at 1,200 effective (Taylor), Breckinridge most probably 2,500, and Pickett 5,000 by the best information, 8,700 muskets in all; he disputes Badeau's 9,162 for Pickett, taken from a division return of November 27, 1863 that Humphreys could not find. He estimates Hancock's force at not over 24,000 infantry and says Lee might have attacked it with about 36,000.

Reinforcements and Humphreys' estimates, not opening strengths; the Pickett figures conflict. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says the banks at Jericho Mills were high and precipitous, and that Lee's well-chosen line, resting on Little River and the North Anna, left the two Union wings separated so the river had to be crossed twice to reinforce, while Lee could reinforce in a third of the time. NPS calls it the 'hog snout line' that forced Grant to divide his army.

The river predates the battle; Lee's line was built during the operations. Not tagged; no map verification.