Crater VA070

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Burnside believed the mine undiscovered though the Confederates had detected the mining, and that signal-station observation found detached batteries rather than a connected second line; prisoners at 6 a.m. said there was no line in their rear.

Attributed knowledge from an interested history.

supportedunresolved Burnside says the mine was dug with only the ordinary spade and pick and charged with about 8,000 pounds of powder; Humphreys gives eight magazines of 1,000 pounds each and says Burnside's parapets, abatis, pioneers and intrenching tools were not prepared as ordered. Burnside says the men in the crater suffered from want of water.

Engineering and preparation statements; Burnside and Humphreys disagree on the preparations.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Meade told Burnside and his division commanders that immediate advantage must be taken to gain the crest and that holding the crater would be of no use; Burnside says orders were sent to advance to the crest without halting at the works.

Stated aims from interested accounts.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. Humphreys says the counterattack left the enemy in possession of nearly all their works right of the mine and that Meade, with Grant's concurrence, suspended the offensive; Burnside says the colored division broke in disorder to the rear.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 5,300 total and the live field 5,289 (US 3,798; CS 1,491). Humphreys gives Meade's report of 4,400 Union killed, wounded and missing, the Medical Department table's 4,008, his own estimate of probably 3,500, the colored division's 176 killed, 688 wounded and 801 missing, the table's Confederate 400, 600 and 200 (which he calls erroneous), McMaster's 677 for Elliott's brigade, and Mahone's 1,101 prisoners; Burnside's epoch table gives the Fourth Division 170 killed, 688 wounded and 801 missing.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Burnside's and Humphreys' Fourth Division killed differ (170 against 176).

supportedunresolved Burnside says his plan to lead with the colored division was not adopted and that peremptory orders sent that division in; Humphreys says Ledlie did not accompany his division, that Burnside alone did not carry out his preparatory orders, that Lee ordered two of Mahone's brigades up, and that the assault failed from mismanagement and misbehavior of several chief actors. Meade told Burnside on August 3 that he had asked for his relief. The frozen commanders are Major General Burnside (US) and General Lee (CS); the live page gives Lee as Major General.

Direction and blame are attributed as stated; Burnside's and Meade's accounts are adversarial and the Court of Inquiry record was not inspected. The live rank is not adopted. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

supportedunresolved The frozen force field reads 'IX Corps [US]; elements of the Army of Northern Virginia [CS]' and the live field zero. Humphreys gives the Army of the Potomac 37,984 effective infantry on July 20 and the Army of Northern Virginia 39,295 on July 10 (excluding detached corps), with only Hoke's, Johnson's and Mahone's divisions left in the Petersburg lines. Burnside says his corps had been recruited from under 6,000 veterans to 24,000 men.

Army-wide returns of other dates and a corps recruitment total; not the forces engaged at the crater. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedinherited Humphreys says Elliott's salient was a re-entrant of the Confederate line, exposed with the ground before it to flank fire, and that concealed batteries could not be silenced; Burnside says the enemy's lines were involuted and complex, a labyrinth of pits, traverses and bomb-proofs.

The lines predate the assault. No map verification.

supportedcommander_created The Union mine made the crater: Humphreys gives it about 150 feet long, 60 wide and 25 deep; Burnside says it was a crater of large proportions and a formidable obstacle, which troops could not cross in organized regiments.

Commander-created feature tagged as such; it became an obstacle to the attackers themselves.