Deep Bottom II VA071

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Grant acted on information that Lee had detached three infantry and one cavalry division, that the movement was concealed to suggest troops bound for Washington, and that the information proved erroneous.

Attributed knowledge from an interested history.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says the steamers carrying the Second Corps were unsuited to troops, could not run close in the shoal water on an ebbing tide, and delayed disembarkation until nine o'clock on August 14.

Transport statement from an interested history; no return inspected.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Hancock was sent to threaten Richmond to prevent further detachments by Lee and, if possible, draw back those sent, with Gregg to dash on Richmond or destroy the railroads if the chance offered.

Stated aims from an interested history.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. Lee reported that the enemy broke through on August 16 but was repulsed and the original positions reoccupied; Humphreys says Terry's attack carried the works with prisoners but the enemy soon retook them, leaving Birney only the picket line, and that the command withdrew on the night of the 20th.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 4,600 total and the live field 4,200 (US 2,900; CS 1,300). Humphreys gives the nominal-list casualties as 321 killed, 1,840 wounded and 625 missing (2,786), against Badeau's table of 1,498 killed and wounded and 515 missing (2,013), and found no Confederate statement; Lee's August 16, 8.30 p.m. dispatch calls that day's loss small.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap.

supportedunresolved Humphreys relays Hancock's criticism that Barlow assaulted with only one brigade instead of two divisions, says Birney's wide circuit delayed his attack until the 16th, and that Hancock was kept north of the James though directed not to assault the works. The frozen commanders are Lee and Field (CS) and Hancock (US); the live page lists Hancock and 'Major General Robert Lee'.

Criticism attributed as stated; Lee's and Field's roles are not described in the inspected passages beyond Lee's reports. The live rank is not adopted. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

supportedunresolved The frozen force field reads 'Corps' and the live field zero. Humphreys gives the effective infantry of the Army of the Potomac at this time as 33,684 and of the Army of the James as 18,449, and says Field's division held the Bailey's Creek line with Wilcox's joining and Mahone's division and Hampton's and W. H. F. Lee's cavalry sent to reinforce them; the only division actually sent to Early was Kershaw's.

Army-wide effective infantry, not the force north of the James; the Confederate side is by formations only. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Barlow's line stretched nearly a mile and a half through thick woods toward Fussell's mill and that the wooded country prevented Hancock's personal examination; Lee says the Union right was found strongly intrenched on August 18.

Woods predate the operation; the works on both sides were built during it. No map verification.