Saltville VA076

supportedunresolved Burbridge says the enemy were under Echols, Williams, Vaughn 'and, it is said, Breckinridge', and gives his estimate of their strength as learned from prisoners; he received Sherman's order to return on the 3rd. Jackson reported on October 1 and in the dispatch printed as October 2, 5 p.m., that an attack was expected, and asked for reinforcements.

Knowledge claimed by each commander; no message log inspected. Jackson's dispatch printed as 5 p.m. on the 2nd describes the attack as still expected, so its printed date and hour are not reconciled with the October 2 action.

supportedunresolved Burbridge says his ammunition gave out in the evening and that only this prevented occupation of the works, and that his men were fatigued and horses jaded on the return. Jackson reported his men all armed but ammunition insufficient, particularly .69 caliber.

Ammunition statements from both commanders; no ordnance return inspected.

supportedunresolved NPS says Burbridge attempted to destroy the saltworks near Saltville and retired without accomplishing his objective; Burbridge reports that some of the outer salt-works were destroyed. Jackson said that without reinforcements his defense could only be feeble.

Stated aims and outcome from a summary and the two commanders.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Confederate victory; the live Results field reads Union Victory. Burbridge says he drove the enemy from his works on the left and center, whipped him at every point and forced him back to his main works, and withdrew after dark when his ammunition gave out. NPS says Burbridge retired without accomplishing his objective after day-long fighting, and dates the attack to the morning of October 1, as does the frozen description itself; the frozen date and Burbridge's dispatch give October 2.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The live result field conflicts with the frozen result and is not adopted.

supportedpost_outcome NPS says that afterwards Confederate soldiers were said to have murdered, captured and wounded Black soldiers. Gardner, a Union surgeon left with the wounded and captured on October 3, reports that armed men he believed to be Confederate soldiers took 5 wounded Black privates from the field hospital that morning and shot them; that on October 7 armed men shot 2 wounded Black prisoners dead in their beds at Emory and Henry College Hospital; that on October 8 men in Confederate uniform overpowered the guard and shot Lieutenant E. C. Smith, and threatened other officers, whom the Confederate surgeon in charge and attendants helped protect; and that he was informed of further outrages after he left.

Recorded as NPS's hedged statement and Gardner's witness report; the Confederate reports read (Jackson's No. 10, selected; Echols's No. 9, Williams's No. 11 and Vaughn's No. 12, read and not selected) give no account of these events, and the perpetrators' identity rests on Gardner's belief. Brisbin's report on the Fifth U.S. Colored Cavalry was read and not selected. No count is adopted, and these deaths are not added to the battle's casualty figures.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen casualty field reads 458 total; the live field reads 458 (US 350; CS 108). Burbridge gives his loss as about 350, and 350, and the enemy's as more. Jackson's inspected dispatches give no loss figure; his October letter reports prisoners sent to Lynchburg, their number read '01' in OCR, including the surgeons and attendants at Emory Hospital.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Burbridge's 350 matches the live Union figure; the live Confederate 108 has no inspected basis.

supportedunresolved The frozen and live commanders are Brigadier Generals Stephen Burbridge and Alfred E. Jackson. NPS says the delay at the gaps enabled Jackson to concentrate troops near Saltville and that reinforcements continued to arrive during the day. Burbridge names Echols, Williams and Vaughn, with Breckinridge said to be present, as commanding against him, says Gillem did not come close enough to operate, and says he withdrew his command after dark. Jackson's dispatches show him reporting to Echols before the attack and asking for reinforcements.

Command roles from a summary and the two commanders; who commanded the Confederate defense during the action is not settled by the inspected passages. The listed commanders do not receive automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads Divisions (11,000 total) with a battle-level strength of 11,000 and no side bounds; the live field reads zero. Burbridge reported his force as 2,500 engaged, and the enemy's, from prisoners, as between 6,000 and 8,000 (read 'G,0()0' in OCR) with Breckinridge said to be present with 4,000 from Lynchburg; his October 10 dispatch gives from 6,000 to 10,000 (the first figure read '0,000'). Jackson's dispatch printed as October 2, 5 p.m., gives the enemy as variously estimated at 4,000 to 8,000, with 2,000 dismounted reported moving by the Russell road, and says 300 men ordered to Saltville had arrived in perfect insubordination.

Figures of one commander for his own side and prisoners' or scouts' estimates of the other; no return. The frozen 11,000 has no side split or inspected basis. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved NPS says Burbridge was delayed at Clinch Mountain and Laurel Gap. Jackson reported Giltner forced to evacuate Laurel Creek Gap and sent men to the Tumbling Creek Gap. Burbridge says the enemy were strongly intrenched on the bluffs around the salt-works, and that his troops took the works on the left and center overlooking the salt-works.

Ground and works described by the two commanders and a summary; no map verification. The Saltville works predate the attack; the gaps were fought over during the approach, so the phase is left unresolved.