Walkerton VA125

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Dahlgren, hearing Kilpatrick's guns but receiving no word, withdrew believing Kilpatrick had failed, and then became separated in the night from the larger part of his command under Captain Mitchell. Kilpatrick says Mitchell reported that Dahlgren and Cooke had become separated and that nothing had been heard of them since. Pollard says his scouts told him early on March 2 that part of the column that attacked Richmond was trying to escape through King William and King and Queen Counties to Gloucester Point. For the raid, Kilpatrick reported the Ely's Ford crossing a complete surprise, while Humphreys says Bradley Johnson telegraphed Richmond on February 29 that a strong cavalry force was on a raid.

What each side knew is reported after the event; Pollard's scouting is his own account. The Ely's Ford surprise and the Johnson telegram concern the raid's opening, not the ambush.

supportedunresolved Kilpatrick's March 6 dispatch lists the raid's transport as 6 guns, 8 caissons, 3 wagons and 6 ambulances at the start, and 3,595 horses, the same guns, caissons and wagons, and 4 ambulances on March 6. Pollard says Dahlgren's party crossed the Mattapony swimming its horses; Kilpatrick's March 8 dispatch says the ambushed party had a large number of negroes with it.

Raid-level transport only; no ration, forage or ammunition state of Dahlgren's detachment on March 2 was inspected. The inspector's tabular statement of losses of men, horses and equipment (read, not selected) is garbled in OCR.

supportedunresolved Pleasonton's order sent Kilpatrick 'on a raid to Richmond for the purpose of liberating our prisoners'; Humphreys says the release of the prisoners was the chief object, and that the President also wished his amnesty proclamation distributed. Dahlgren's part was to cross the James, release the prisoners at Belle Isle and enter Richmond from the south side. By March 2 his detachment was trying to escape: Humphreys says apparently toward Gloucester, opposite Yorktown, and Pollard says toward Gloucester Point. Pollard set out to head off and ambush it.

The raid objective is Meade's and Pleasonton's; at Walkerton the Union objective was escape. The disputed Dahlgren papers are recorded separately.

disputedpost_outcome NPS says papers found on Dahlgren's body ordered him to burn Richmond and kill Davis and his cabinet. Lee's April 1 letter, printed in Humphreys' appendix, quotes a second, unsigned paper: 'once in the city it must be destroyed and Jeff Davis and Cabinet killed.' Meade replied that neither the Government, he nor Kilpatrick authorized or approved burning the city or killing Davis and his cabinet; Kilpatrick wrote that the address Dahlgren showed him and that he approved did not contain those passages, and that Dahlgren received no orders from him to pillage, burn or kill. Fitzhugh Lee, quoted by Humphreys, says Pollard brought him the papers and that they were not altered before they reached him.

The authenticity and authority of the papers are disputed in the sources and are not resolved here; this is an objectives dispute about the raid, recorded after the ambush that produced the papers. Humphreys signed the March 14 inquiry printed in the same appendix.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results are Confederate victory. Pollard says Dahlgren was killed at the first fire and several wounded, the party retreated in confusion, and at daylight all but the officers and a few men surrendered, the officers and most of the rest being captured later; Kilpatrick says all save 21 were taken prisoners, and Humphreys that many were killed and wounded and the greater part of the rest captured. The time of the ambush differs: Pollard says the enemy advanced about 11.30 p.m. (his April 9 report says Fox arrived about 10 or 11 o'clock, a few minutes before), Humphreys says Wednesday night, and Kilpatrick's March 8 dispatch says 'Thursday evening, 11 p. m.', which the OR compiler footnotes as Wednesday, March 2. For the raid as a whole, Kilpatrick reported that he failed in its great object.

The engagement result is the destruction of the detachment; the raid's failure and the papers' political effects are campaign and post-outcome context. The compiler's footnote is not Kilpatrick's statement.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty field reads 'Unknown'; the live page gives 100 total (US 100; CS 0). For the ambush, Kilpatrick's March 8 dispatch says Dahlgren was killed and 7 men wounded; Pollard says Dahlgren and several others were hit and that about 175 were captured in all, 40 negroes and 135 soldiers; Kilpatrick's report says all save 21 of the party were taken. For the raid, Kilpatrick's March 3 dispatch says he lost less than 150 men, and his March 6 dispatch gives 3,585 men at the start and 3,317 on that day.

Pollard's 175 includes non-combatants and later captures; the 21 who escaped and the 80-100 men of the party are not reconciled with it. The raid-wide figures are not assigned to this record; the live CS zero is not measured absence. No Confederate loss for the ambush appears in the inspected passages. Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap.

disputedunresolved The frozen commanders are Major General Wade Hampton (CS), Brigadier General H. Judson Kilpatrick and Colonel Ulric Dahlgren (US); the live page lists Kilpatrick as 'Hugh' and Hampton as Lieutenant General, and omits Dahlgren. None of the inspected passages places Hampton or Kilpatrick at Walkerton: Humphreys puts Hampton's attack near Atlee's Station on Tuesday night (March 1), Kilpatrick learned from prisoners that Hampton made the night attack he had repulsed, NPS puts Hampton's attack near Old Church on the 2nd, and on the evening of the 2nd Kilpatrick's main column camped near Tunstall's Station. Dahlgren commanded the ambushed detachment and was killed at the first fire; Kilpatrick says Major Cooke then commanded it. On the Confederate side, Pollard says he chose the position and posted McGruder's men and the home guard, and sent for Fox, who arrived shortly before the action and, in his April 9 report, 'then took command'. Stuart's indorsement credits Pollard's dispositions; Humphreys says the ambush was formed chiefly through the efforts of Fox and Pollard.

The frozen commander rows reflect the raid, not the ambush. Pollard's and Fox's roles are contested in the inspected record (Fox's reports, read, not selected, bear on the same question). No listed commander receives automatic credit for the Walkerton result.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads 'Brigades' and the live page gives zero totals. Raid-wide: Pleasonton's order set the command at 4,000 men with one battery (Humphreys and NPS also give 4,000); Kilpatrick's report says he left with 2,375 men, Ransom's six-gun battery and detachments, 'in all 3,582 strong', while his March 6 dispatch gives 3,585 men at the start and 3,317 men on that day. Dahlgren's advance was 460 men (Kilpatrick) or 500 (Humphreys and NPS). At Walkerton: Kilpatrick's report and March 6 dispatch give Dahlgren about 100 men after the separation, his March 8 dispatch about 80 men and a large number of negroes, and NPS about 100; Kilpatrick's report says Captain Mitchell rejoined him with upward of 300 officers and men of Dahlgren's party, and Humphreys gives 300. On the Confederate side, Pollard gives his own company as about 25 men, McGruder's reinforcement as about 30 men and a number of the home guard, and Fox's arrival with about 15 men; Kilpatrick says Dahlgren's party was surrounded by a large force of citizens and regular soldiers.

The raid-wide figures differ by date and basis (an ordered strength, a starting count and a later count) and belong to the raid, not to the ambush. The ambush counts are approximate and partial; Pollard does not give the home guard's number. Fox's own count of the ambush force (No. 11, read, not selected) is not used. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Humphreys and Kilpatrick say Dahlgren crossed the Pamunkey at Hanovertown and the Mattapony at Aylett's; Pollard says he crossed at Aylett's by a wood-boat, swimming his horses. Pollard placed the ambush 'at a point that the enemy was obliged to pass'; his April 9 report says 'I put them in the position which I had chosen about dark'. Pollard says the survivors left the roads for the fields, where they were found dismounted at daylight. Humphreys and Kilpatrick put the ambush about three miles from King and Queen Court House; NPS places it in King and Queen County near Walkerton. Kilpatrick calls the night of March 1 intensely dark, cold and stormy.

Rivers and roads predate the action; the ambush position was chosen by the Confederate detachments during the pursuit, so the claim is not tagged inherited. The weather statement is for the night of March 1 near Richmond, not the ambush night. No map verification.