Carnifex Ferry WV006
1861-09-10 to 1861-09-10 · WV · Operations in Western Virginia [June-December 1861] · frozen result: Union · NPS summary (as listed)
Learning of Col. Erastus Tyler's rout at Kessler's Cross Lanes, Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans moved three brigades south from Clarksburg to support him. On the afternoon of September 10, he advanced against Brig. Gen. John Floyd's camps at Carnifex Ferry. Darkness halted several hours' fighting. The strength of the Union artillery convinced Floyd to retreat during the night. Floyd blamed his defeat on his co-commander Brig. Gen. Henry Wise, contributing to further dissension in the Confederate ranks.
Command responsibility (ledger v2)
US: William S. Rosecrans
Grade A under rule 2; echelon unknown.
Rule 2, single listing. Floyd (from prisoners) has the enemy under Rosecrans's command when the battle commenced; Rosecrans reports the column under his command, directing Benham's brigade forward and deciding to withdraw at dusk. Echelon not stated (a column of three brigades).
Brigadier Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle WV006, belligerent US, fullname William S. Rosecrans; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…the enemy, under command of Gen- eral Eosecrans, as we learned through prisonersor5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1 · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…Under these circumstances I deemed it prudent to withdraw our forces from the woodsor5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1 · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…Confederate: John B. Floyd
Grade A under rule 2; echelon army.
Rule 2, single listing. Floyd's report, signed 'Commanding Army of Kanawha' by his adjutant, has the battle commence at his intrenchments and Floyd deciding to recross the Gauley. The description's 'co-commander' Wise did not come up; he is not shown in command of the engaged force.
Brigadier Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle WV006, belligerent Confederate, fullname John Floyd; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…JOHN B. FLOYD, Brigadier -General^ Commanding Army of Kanaivha.or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1 · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…I therefore determined at once to recross the Gauley Eiver and take position upon the left bank,or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1 · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…Side strength (ledger v3)
US: grade C, 6,380 (4,250–8,500)
basis_mixedopponent_estimate_pointsingle_inputwhole_engagement_leakage
| Input | Class | Printed | Basis | Bound | Codes | Passage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| us-floyd-8000-9000 | C | 8,000–9,000 | unknown | adversary_or_hearsay_estimate | dossier claim reported-force-scope |
Confederate: grade B, 1,800 (1,530–2,070)
basis_mixedsingle_inputwhole_engagement_leakage
| Input | Class | Printed | Basis | Bound | Codes | Passage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cs-floyd-lt-2000 | bound | 2,000 | reported_engaged | upper | one_sided_bound | dossier claim reported-force-scope |
| cs-floyd-1800 | B | 1,800 | unknown | dossier claim reported-force-scope |
Dossier claims
Draft dossier, revision western-virginia-1861-review-correction-2026-09-25. Claims are extraction records with their quoted passages, not historical adjudication. JSON
information
supportedunresolved Rosecrans says cavalry prisoners told him Floyd was strongly intrenched and confident, that the extent of the works was very imperfectly known at dusk, and that a runaway contraband reported Floyd's night crossing. Floyd says he was fully aware of the Union advance.
Knowledge as each commander reports it; no scouting record inspected.
from whom we found that Floyd was strongly intrenched and confident of holding his posi- tion against great oddsor5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.129 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…the strength and condition of the rebels, as well as the extent of their works, very imperfectly known.or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.131 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…a runaway contraband came in and reported that the euemy had crossed the Gauley during the nightor5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.129 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…of ’whose advance I was fully aware,or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…logistics
supportedunresolved Rosecrans says his column marched 17½ miles (read '17^' in OCR) on the day of battle and fought for three hours, after weeks of marching and sleeping without tents, and that it had no material to repair the bridge. Floyd says he failed to obtain reinforcement.
Condition statements from the two commanders; no returns inspected.
We yesterday marched 17^ miles,or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.128 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…That on the day of battle they should have marched 17^ miles and then fought a battle of three hours,or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.132 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…sleeping in heavy dews and cold rains, not unfrequently without tents,or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.132 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…having no material tor immediately repairing the bridge,or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.129 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…I failed in procuring re-enforcement,or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…objectives
supportedunresolved Rosecrans directed Benham to feel the enemy closely but not engage unless he saw an evident opening, and had Cox make a diversion. Floyd says he meant to hold with reinforcements and believed he could have marched into the Kanawha valley had Wise's column come up.
Stated aims and counterfactual claims from the two commanders.
He was directed to be very careful to feel the enemy closely, but not to engage him unless he saw an evident opening.or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.130 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…General Cox had been instructed, on hearing the fire of our can- non, to operate a diversionor5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.132 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…I made an effort to strengthen myself, first by re- enforcement, and secondly by intrenchmentsor5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.146 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…I am very confident that I could have beaten the enemy and have marched directly to the valley of Kanawha if the re enforcements from General Wise’s column had come up when orderedor5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…outcome
disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. NPS says darkness halted several hours' fighting and Union artillery convinced Floyd to retreat. Floyd says he repulsed five assaults and recrossed without losing a gun; Rosecrans says the enemy crossed the Gauley in the night and his troops took the camp with prisoners, colors and stores.
Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The duration differs: Rosecrans gives a battle of three hours, Floyd nearly four hours of fire.
We repulsed them in five distinct and successive assaults,or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…which I accomplished without the loss of a gun or any accident whatever.or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…fought a battle of three hours,or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.132 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…after a continued firing upon us by cannon and small-arms for nearly tour hours,or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…capturing a few prisoners, two stands of colors, a considerable quantity of arms and quartermaster’s stores, messing and camp equipage.or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.129 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 250 total; the live field reads 190 (US 158; CS 32). Rosecrans estimated 20 killed and 100 wounded on September 11 and gives 16 killed and 100 wounded in his September 21 report; Floyd reports only 20 wounded on his side.
Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap.
Our loss would jrrobably amount to 20 killed and 100 wounded.or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.129 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…amounting in the aggregate to 16 killed and 100 wounded.or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.132 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…was only 20 men wounded.or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…responsibility
supportedunresolved The frozen commanders are Brigadier General John Floyd and Brigadier General William S. Rosecrans; the live page gives Rosecrans as Major General. Rosecrans says he directed the brigades and decided to withdraw from the woods at dusk; Floyd says he decided to recross the Gauley, his report being signed by his adjutant because of an injury; NPS says Floyd blamed Wise.
Command roles from the two commanders; no automatic sole credit and the live rank is not adopted.
Brigadier Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle WV006, belligerent Confederate, fullname John Floyd; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…Brigadier Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle WV006, belligerent US, fullname William S. Rosecrans; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…Under these circumstances I deemed it prudent to withdraw our forces from the woodsor5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.131 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…I therefore determined at once to recross the Gauley Eiver and take position upon the left bank,or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…This is signed by Adjutant Peters, because an injury prevents my holding a pen.or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.148 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…Floyd blamed his defeat on his co-commander Brig. Gen. Henry Wise,nps-wv006-v1, Description · snapshot
0af8d8445348…strength
unknownunresolved
No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.
disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads Brigades; the live field reads zero. NPS says Rosecrans moved three brigades south. Floyd says Rosecrans came with ten regiments, estimated at 8,000-9,000, against less than 2,000 engaged, and later that he had 1,800. Rosecrans reports Floyd's force as five regiments besides one driven in, with probably sixteen guns; papers found in camp showed at least five regiments, two batteries and a battalion of cavalry.
Each side's estimate of the other and Floyd's own round figures; no return for either side. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence.
Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans moved three brigades south from Clarksburg to support him.nps-wv006-v1, Description · snapshot
0af8d8445348…at the head of ten regiments,or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…The enemy’s force is estimated certainly between 8,000 and 9,000 inen, whilst our force engaged was less than 2,000.or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…if I could have com- manded the services of 5,000 men instead of 1,800, which I had,or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…His force was five regiments, besides the one driven in. He had probably sixteen pieces of artillery.or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.128 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…Papers found in camp showed that Floyd’s force consisted of at least five regiments, two batteries, and a battalion of cavalry,or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.132 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…terrain
supportedunresolved Rosecrans found Floyd strongly intrenched behind a forest too dense to see beyond 300 yards, and describes the Gauley there as running through a deep gorge with the ferry 370 feet wide. Floyd says he built a temporary breastwork and that his extended lines left no reserve.
Ground from the two commanders' reports; no plan inspected. Floyd built the breastwork before the attack.
We found him occupying a strongly intrenched position, covered by a forest too dense to admit its being seen at a dis- tance of 300 yards.or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.128 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…The Gauley here runs through a deep gorge,or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.131 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…Finding we had no means whatever of crossing the ferry, which is here 370 feet wide, pursuit was impossible,or5-rosecrans-kanawha-selections-v1, p.131 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
f6723bd253ce…succeeded somewhat better in the construction of a temporary breastwork.or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…Our lines were necessarily very extended for the purpose of protecting onr posi- tion, and when manned left not one man for reserve.or5-floyd-carnifex-selections-v1, p.147 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1f74e55770a3…Open questions
- The brigade and regimental reports (Nos. 2-13), the No. 14 casualty statement, Wise's September 11 letter and the rest of his October 26 report were read at most in part and not selected.
- NPS/CWSAC is one family. Rosecrans's September 11 telegram and September 21, 1861 report (Official Records Series I, Volume V) are one family of interested Union accounts. Floyd's September 12, 1861 report, signed by his adjutant (same volume), is one family of interested Confederate accounts. The Official Records volumes are shared containers, not additional witnesses. Report dates are not event times or proof of contemporary knowledge. No Scribner Campaigns of the Civil War volume narrates this engagement; Nicolay's Chapter XII ends with McClellan's campaign in July.
- No automatic commander attribution, causal campaign score, morale/readiness number or battle/campaign double counting.