Greenbrier River WV007

supportedunresolved Jackson says he feared another column had crossed the mountains to turn his right, thought his fortifying had invited the attack, and had lost communication with Loring for several days. Reynolds says he saw heavy reinforcements arrive while in front of the works.

Each commander's report of his own perceptions; no signal record inspected.

supportedunresolved Reynolds says his force marched 24 miles and was under fire four hours. Jackson says he could bring no more than five guns against eight, had no cavalry to pursue, and believed the attackers carried four days' cooked rations.

Condition statements from the two reports; Jackson's statement about Union rations is his inference.

disputedunresolved NPS and Reynolds call the movement an armed reconnaissance, and Reynolds says its object was fully accomplished. Jackson describes an enemy that came to bombard and storm his camp.

The two sides characterize the Union aim differently; the attacker's stated aim is not adopted as proven.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Inconclusive and the live result Indecisive. Reynolds says he retired in good order after disabling three guns; Jackson says the attack was repulsed and the whole enemy force retreated in confusion; NPS says Reynolds withdrew after sporadic fighting and an abortive attempt on the Confederate right.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The duration differs: Reynolds says four hours under fire; Jackson's October 3 dispatch gives an attack at 8 o'clock and four and a half hours of fire, and his October 7 report says the engagement lasted from 7 in the morning to 2.30 in the afternoon.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 80 (US 40; CS 40); the live field reads 95 (US 43; CS 52). Reynolds reports his own loss as 8 killed and 32 wounded and believes the enemy's reached at least 300, with 13 prisoners taken; Jackson reports his own as not exceeding 50 and estimates the enemy's at 250-300.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap.

supportedunresolved The frozen and live commanders are Brigadier General Henry R. Jackson and Brigadier General Joseph Reynolds. Jackson says Colonel Edward Johnson commanded the advance guard in person and that he himself disposed the regiments; Reynolds describes directing the advance and the withdrawal.

Command roles from the two reports; no automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads Brigades; the live field reads zero. NPS says Reynolds advanced with two brigades. Reynolds gives his force as about 5,000, four regiments reduced to about half strength, and the enemy's as about 9,000. Jackson estimated the attackers at 5,000 on October 3 and at 6,000-7,000 on October 7, with the column against his right at some 4,000; he gives no count of his own.

Each side's estimates; no return inspected. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Jackson says his position was not naturally commanding, with lines of not less than a mile to defend, and that his works were only partly complete, nothing done on his right flank or rear; a ditch and embankment built under Taliaferro sheltered one brigade. Reynolds put his batteries about 700 yards from the intrenchments.

Ground from the two reports; no map inspected. The works were under construction when attacked.