Droop Mountain WV012

supportedunresolved Echols says Jackson's estimate had been overtaken by reinforcements arriving in the night without his knowledge, and that the Federal force on the left was so masked that it could not at first be estimated. Averell says the arrival of Confederate reinforcements was announced by a band, flags and cheers on the summit, and that the guide sent with Moor's infantry proved worthless.

Attributed knowledge from interested accounts on both sides; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Echols says his brigade marched 14 miles on the 5th and, moving at 2 a.m., reached Jackson's position about 9 a.m. having marched 14 miles, except the Twenty-sixth Battalion, detached with one gun some 12 miles from the position to hold another road; his artillery and trains came away safely except a howitzer whose carriage broke during the retreat. In his November 7 dispatch, the day after the battle, Averell reported his troops in excellent spirits with plenty of ammunition.

Movement and supply statements from interested accounts; no return inspected. Averell's statement is a post-battle report, not a pre-battle supply return; Echols's trains statement concerns the retreat. The detachment bears on who was present but is not a strength count.

supportedunresolved Averell says a direct attack was thought difficult, so he sent the infantry to attack the Confederate left and rear while a demonstration on the right diverted attention; for the 5th he says it was not thought proper to press the enemy vigorously, in order to keep him as far as possible from Lewisburg and to gain the advantage of Duffie's arrival there (the printed sentence contains an editorial "[not ?]"), though three mounted regiments tried unsuccessfully to cut off Jackson's retreat. Echols says the Federals meant to capture his command and Jackson's and then move on the interior railroad lines. NPS says the raid aimed to disrupt the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad.

Stated plans and an opponent's inference of intent; not a causal estimate.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Averell calls the victory decisive and the retreat a total rout; Echols says he ordered the troops to fall back slowly, that on the 4-mile mountain road an alarm produced some confusion among the horse-holders of the dismounted cavalry and some men became detached and made their way out through the woods, and that the rear guard held the pursuit in check; he judges the expedition's results to the enemy at nothing. NPS says the Union columns reunited at Lewisburg but could not continue the raid.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The characterizations of the retreat conflict; campaign effects are context.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 526 total; the live field reads 415 (US 140; CS 275). Averell reported his loss as about 100 and the Confederate loss in killed and wounded as about 250. Echols gives his killed, wounded and missing as 275, many of the missing having returned.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Echols's 275 equals the live Confederate figure.

supportedunresolved Averell attributes the infantry attack's success chiefly to Colonel Augustus Moor. Echols says he assumed command of the whole force on reaching Jackson's position and at about 4 p.m. ordered the troops to fall back. The frozen and live commanders are Brigadier Generals William W. Averell and John Echols.

Command roles from interested accounts; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads Brigades; the live field reads zero. Averell says his infantry attack was 1,175 strong and, from prisoners' reports, puts the Confederate force at about 4,000 with 7 guns. Echols says his force actually engaged was about 1,700 against about 7,000, that Jackson's earlier estimate of 3,500 was correct when made, and that the two Union columns together numbered nearly 10,000.

Each commander gives the opponent the larger number, and Averell gives no total for his own force; the figures differ in basis and scope. None is adopted as matched opening strength. Live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Averell compares the position to South Mountain but stronger from natural difficulties and breastworks, says the northern slope was partially cultivated nearly to the summit, a distance the OCR reads as "2| miles" from the foot (fraction not checked against print), and says the Confederates were somewhat protected by rude breastworks of logs, stones and earth. Echols says the position overlooked the Little Levels and that the retreat had to follow a narrow road along the mountain top for 4 miles.

Natural ground and field works whose construction time is not established; no inherited tag is used. No map verification.