Moorefield WV013

supportedunresolved Johnson says McCausland directed no scouts on his front, that the only warning was a 2 a.m. verbal order that Averell had passed Romney, which did not suggest imminent attack, and that the pickets were captured by men in Confederate uniform. Pond says McCausland had more warning than Johnson.

Attributed knowledge from an interested subordinate and a history; Johnson's account of the picket capture is secondhand from a prisoner.

supportedunresolved Johnson blames the insufficient armament of his command: besides the First and Second Maryland and a squadron of the Eighth Virginia there was not a saber, and the Enfield musket could not be reloaded against charging cavalry. Pond says Averell arrived after a forced march through Bath, Springfield and Romney.

An interested account of equipment, not an ordnance return.

supportedunresolved Pond says that after McCausland's repulse at Cumberland, Halleck urged that Averell be pushed to cut off his retreat and Hunter repeated the orders; Early's plan sent McCausland against Cumberland and the railroad.

Stated orders as described by a history.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Union victory and the live result Union Victory. Pond says the whole Confederate body was soon in disorderly retreat; Johnson says that after the river fight the enemy only followed him. NPS and Early (as quoted by Pond) say the defeat damaged the Confederate cavalry for the rest of the campaign.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The later effect on the cavalry is campaign context, not the tactical result.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 531 total; the live field reads 531 (US 31; CS 500). Pond says Averell captured four guns, over 400 horses, three flags and 420 prisoners including 38 officers, with his own loss given as 41 killed and wounded. Johnson says he reached the Valley with about 300 men missing, 150 of whom had come in, "leaving that number as my net loss killed, wounded, and missing" (read here as a net of about 150; the antecedent is ambiguous and is not resolved), and gives the attackers' loss at the river as 2 majors and 38 men.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Kelley's figures in the Volume XLIII continuation were read but not selected.

supportedunresolved Johnson says McCausland commanded the expedition, chose camps, routes and pickets, slept in Moorefield three miles from his camp, and arrived after part of Johnson's brigade had crossed the river; he asks for a court of inquiry and alleges plunder weakened the fight. Pond credits Gibson's and Powell's brigades with the attack. The frozen commanders are Brigadier Generals John McCausland and William W. Averell.

Johnson's charges are an interested subordinate's allegations against his superior, not an adjudication; neither listed commander receives automatic sole credit or blame.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads Divisions; the live field reads zero. Johnson says his First and Second Maryland together had not 130 men in camp, and that McCausland's courier reported Averell passing Romney with three brigades of cavalry. Pond names Averell's brigades under Gibson and Powell and a battalion under Major Work.

Fragmentary unit counts and reported enemy composition; no whole-force count for either side. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Johnson says McCausland chose the camps: McCausland on the Moorefield side of the South Branch, Johnson's brigade along the Romney road for grass, his outer regiment four and a half miles from Moorefield. He calls his camp level ground with every artillery position favouring an attacker, the good hills being on McCausland's side of the river. Pond says the attack drove Johnson through the stream to the main position on the opposite bank.

An interested subordinate's description and a history; the camps were chosen during the raid and are not tagged inherited.