Summit Point WV014
1864-08-21 to 1864-08-21 · WV · Sheridan's Valley Campaign [August-October 1864] · frozen result: Inconclusive · NPS summary (as listed)
As Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan concentrated his army near Charles Town, Lt. Gen. Jubal Early and Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson attacked the Federals with converging columns on August 21. Early moved east via Smithfield against the Union VI Corps. Anderson struck north against Wilson's Union cavalry at Summit Point. There was cavalry fighting near Berryville. The Federals fought effective delaying actions, withdrawing to near Halltown on the following day.
Dossier claims
Draft dossier, revision sheridan-valley-review-correction-2026-09-25. Claims are extraction records with their quoted passages, not historical adjudication. JSON
information
supportedunresolved Pond says Sheridan's information put at least one more of Longstreet's divisions in the Valley while Grant's scouts said only Kershaw's and Fitz Lee's had gone, so the Confederate strength and purposes remained obscure. Sheridan's report says the enemy mistakenly thought he was near Summit Point and tried to get into his rear.
Attributed knowledge from a history and an interested report; no message log inspected.
all his information was to the effect that at least one additional division of Longstreet's old corps was already in the Valley.pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.133 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…no division or brigade has gone from Lee's army to the Valley except Kershaw's and Fitz Lee's.pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.134 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…While the Confederate strength and purposes thus re- mained obscure,pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.134 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…The enemy appeared to have thought that I had taken position near Summit Point,or43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.44 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…logistics
supportedunresolved Pond says Early went only far enough down the Valley to keep the railroad broken and reach grain and forage, Sheridan having burned the Valley above Winchester, and quotes Early to Anderson on August 19 that no wheat had been burned where they were and they could live there.
A history and a Confederate note it quotes; not a supply return.
to be where he could get grain and forage ;pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.133 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…for Sheridan had burned the Valley above Winches- ter.pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.133 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…No wheat has been burned in this country, and if we can stay here we can live.pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.133 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…objectives
supportedunresolved Pond says Early and Anderson planned a combined attack, Early through Smithfield toward Charlestown and Anderson by the Summit Point road. Sheridan says he then fell back to Halltown because much depended on the army.
Stated plans from a history and an interested dispatch.
Early and Anderson determined, the 21st, to attack Sheridan in a combined movement,pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.134 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…while Anderson was to advance by the direct road that runs through Summit Point.pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.135 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…and, as there is much depending on this army, I fell backor43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.19 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…outcome
supportedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Inconclusive and the live result Indecisive. Sheridan says the Sixth Corps' picket-line fight went very much in its favour and that the army moved back to Halltown without loss; Pond says the lost position was regained at nightfall and Anderson's advance was retarded by the cavalry at Berryville and Summit Point. NPS calls the Union actions effective delaying actions.
Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.
resulting very much in its favor.or43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.44 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…During the night of the 21st the army moved back to Halltown without inconvenience or loss,or43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.44 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…the lost position was regained at night- fall,pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.135 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…his advance having been handsomely retarded by Merritt's cavalry division at Berry ville and Wilson's at Summit Point.pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.135 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…The Federals fought effective delaying actions, withdrawing to near Halltown on the following day.nps-wv014-v1, Description · snapshot
81fff81834e3…disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 1,000 total; the live field reads 1000 (US 600; CS 400). Sheridan's Halltown dispatch (day lost in OCR; received 2 a.m. on the 23d) gives "my loss yesterday" as 275, read here as the 21st; Pond gives 260 killed and wounded, mainly in Getty's division. No inspected passage gives a Confederate loss.
Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Sheridan's 275 has no category; Pond's 260 is killed and wounded, mainly in one division. The categories and scope may differ.
(Received 2 a. m. 23d.)or43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.19 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…My loss yesterday was 275.or43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.19 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…with the loss of 260 killed and wounded, mainly in Getty's division.pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.135 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…responsibility
supportedunresolved Pond says Anderson, though senior, declined to take command from Early; that Ricketts's division moved from reserve to the Sixth Corps' left; and that at midnight Sheridan drew in Merritt and Wilson and moved the army to Halltown. The frozen commanders are Lieutenant General Early and Major General Sheridan; the live page gives Early as Major General.
Command roles from a history and an interested report; neither listed commander receives automatic sole credit, and the live rank is not adopted.
Anderson ranked Early, but declined to take command,pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.133 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…Rick- etts was transferred from his position in reserve to the left of the corps line,pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.135 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…At midnight Sheridan drew in Merritt and Wilson, and moved the whole army back to Halltown,pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.135 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…Lieutenant Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle WV014, belligerent Confederate, fullname Jubal A. Early; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…Major Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle WV014, belligerent US, fullname Philip Sheridan; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…strength
unknownunresolved
No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.
disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads Divisions; the live field reads zero. Pond says Anderson brought Kershaw's division, Cutshaw's artillery and two cavalry brigades under Fitz Lee, and that Early advanced Rodes's and Ramseur's divisions against the Sixth Corps. Sheridan's Halltown dispatch headed "Angust 1864" (day lost in OCR; received 2 a.m. on the 23d, so read here as August 22) says prisoners reported the whole enemy present with Longstreet, which he did not believe, one of Longstreet's divisions being there. His 1866 report gives about 18,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry effective on August 13.
Unit identifications and a figure from eight days earlier; no count for either side on August 21. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence.
The force which Anderson brought with him consisted, as has been said, of Kershaw's division, Cutshaw's battalion of artillery, and two brigades of cavalry under Fitz Lee.pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.133 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…advancing the divisions of Bodes and Raruseur.pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.135 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…(Received 2 a. m. 23d.)or43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.19 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…Prisoners cai)tured to-day report tlie whole of the enemy her(‘, with Longstreet. This latter 1 do not believe. One of his divisions is here.or43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.19 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…As my effective line of battle strength at this time was about 18,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry,or43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.42 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…terrain
supportedunresolved Sheridan says his position at Welch's Spring near Charlestown was a very bad one, so he fell back to Halltown; Pond calls Halltown, with a river on either flank, the best defensive position in the Valley. Sheridan's report says the Sixth Corps held near Flowing Spring.
Assessments from an interested dispatch and a history; no map verification.
advanced on my position at Welch’s S£)ring, two miles west of Charlestown.or43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.19 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…My position at best being a very bad one,or43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.19 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…with a river on either flank,pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.135 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…he had the best defensive posi- tion in the Valley.pond-sheridan-valley-selections-v1, p.135 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
ea0bd40e3e63…advanced rapidly on the i)osition of the Sixth Corps near Flowing Spring,or43-1-sheridan-valley-selections-v2, p.44 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b245ca45e6c6…Open questions
- Wright's, Getty's, Merritt's and Wilson's reports, Hotchkiss's journal and the Confederate division reports remain deferred.
- NPS/CWSAC is one family. George E. Pond's The Shenandoah Valley in 1864 (Scribner, 1883) is a retrospective history written, by its preface, from the official documents at the War Records Office and field despatches; it quotes Sheridan's, Torbert's, Wright's and Early's reports and despatches and is not independent of them. Sheridan's dispatches of August-September 1864 and his report dated New Orleans, February 3, 1866 are one family of interested Union accounts. Official Records Series I, Volume XLIII, Part 1 is a shared container, not an additional witness. Report dates are not event times or proof of contemporary knowledge.
- No automatic commander attribution, causal campaign score, morale/readiness number or battle/campaign double counting.