Columbia TN034

supportedunresolved Cox says an examination of the country on the 24th satisfied Schofield that Hood would try to turn his position, and that Wilson's 1 a.m. report on the 29th that Hood's infantry was crossing reached Schofield only at daylight because the messenger had to go by Spring Hill. Hood says the enemy discovered his intention when he was well on the flank. NPS says Schofield correctly interpreted Hood's moves.

Attributed knowledge from an interested history and report; the dispatches were not inspected.

supportedunresolved Cox says storms and frozen mud delayed the rebuilding of the railroad to Tuscumbia and Hood's wagon trains, that Hood could not move faster than ten miles a day, and that on the night of the 27th Schofield partly destroyed the railway bridge and destroyed his heavy wooden pontoon bridge for want of transportation. Hood says the lack of a good map and the deep mud prevented him overtaking Schofield before Columbia. NPS says foul weather delayed the Union crossing.

Transport and weather statements from an interested history and report; no supply return inspected.

supportedunresolved Hood says he hoped to place his army between Schofield and Nashville and, on the 29th, to turn the Union flank at or near Spring Hill and cut off the force at Columbia. Cox says Thomas wanted Schofield to retreat as little and as slowly as possible and to keep a bridge-head. NPS calls the demonstrations at Columbia a diversion to cross upstream.

Stated aims from interested reports and a modern summary.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. Hood and Cox place the Union evacuation of the town on the night of the 27th; NPS says foul weather prevented the Union crossing before November 28, leaving Columbia to the Confederates, and that Schofield slowed but did not stop Hood. Cox says Lee's attempt to cross at Columbia on the afternoon of the 29th was driven back.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The evacuation date differs between the live summary and the two other families.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads Unknown and the live field reads zeros. No inspected passage gives a casualty count for the Columbia operations.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Cox says Schofield ordered Cox's two brigades north of the river on the night of the 25th and moved the whole command across on the night of the 27th, and that Hood 'was too wary to make an assault'; Hood says he left Lee, with the other two divisions of his corps, in front of Columbia (Johnson's division going with Hood) with instructions to press the enemy when he abandoned the position. The frozen commanders are Major General Schofield and General Hood. Cox's own division is one of the actors in his account.

Direction is attributed as the sources state; Cox is an interested participant. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force text names the XXIII Corps and elements of the IV Corps against the Army of Tennessee with no numbers; the live field reads zeros. Cox, citing official returns, says Hood had 41,185 infantry and artillery and 3,544 cavalry (44,729) at Florence on November 6, and 53,938 present after Forrest's 9,209 joined about November 15, against Beauregard's estimate of 35,000 effective; Thomas's October 31 returns showed 48,975 infantry and artillery and 5,591 cavalry present for duty, with the Fourth Corps at 12,331 and the Twenty-third at 10,624. Efforts had raised Wilson's cavalry to about 7,000 equipped, but five regiments sent between the 24th and 27th did not reach the front until the 30th. Hood's addenda table gives an effective total of 30,600 on November 6, and its indorsement reads 'Crossed Tennessee, November 21, 30,600 men.'

Army-wide returns for different dates and bases (present, present for duty, effective); none measures the force engaged at Columbia. In the garbled OCR table of Hood's addenda the cavalry and artillery components (2,306 and 2,405) read the same on both dates; whether the effective totals include Forrest's cavalry is not established. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedinherited Cox says Schofield's position was strong in front but had a river at its back; the river makes a horseshoe bend at the town, and the low north bank in the bend is commanded by the south bank. Hood says the Union line north of the river was considered quite strong in front.

The river and bend predate the engagement. Narrative descriptions from an interested history and report.

supportedunresolved NPS says the Federals built two lines of earthworks south of the town; Cox says Schofield prepared an interior, shorter line and that Cox's own brigades north of the river built breastworks on indented lines against the Confederate artillery on the higher south bank.

Works built during the operations; not tagged as inherited.