Spring Hill TN035

supportedunresolved Cox says Wilson's evening dispatch misled Schofield about Forrest's purposes, leaving him without means of learning Hood's movements except by infantry reconnaissance, and that the Union columns marched past within sight of the Confederate camp-fires. Hood says that about midnight he learned the enemy was moving in great confusion and that it moved within hearing nearly all night.

Attributed knowledge from an interested history and report; the orders and dispatches were not inspected.

supportedunresolved Cox says the army's wagon trains had been ordered to Spring Hill and Stanley arrived about noon just in time to prevent their capture, and that Hood's infantry crossed on the pontoon bridge at Davis's Ford after daylight. Hood says his cavalry could not break through the strongly guarded trains and that the Union trains obstructed the road for fifteen miles during the day and much of the night.

Movement and transport statements from an interested history and report; no transport return inspected.

supportedunresolved Hood says his object was to turn the Union flank and cut off the force at Columbia by placing troops across the Columbia and Franklin pike at or near Spring Hill, and that Cheatham was ordered to attack at once and take the pike. NPS says the aim was to get astride Schofield's line of communication. Cox says Schofield needed time for Ruger to complete his work at the fords below and to ship by rail some artillery which had no horses.

Stated aims from interested reports and a modern summary.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. NPS says the Federals repulsed a piecemeal attack in late afternoon and the rest of Schofield's command passed through Spring Hill to Franklin in the night. Hood calls it the loss of 'the greatest' opportunity of the campaign. Cox says Wagner's division held Spring Hill until the trains and troops were in motion.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads Unknown; the live field reads 850 (US 350; CS 500). No inspected passage gives a count for Spring Hill.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The live figure's source is not stated.

disputedunresolved Hood says Cheatham, despite repeated orders, made 'but a feeble and partial attack', and in December wrote that Cheatham had confessed the error and taken all blame. Cox says Hood 'sought to shift the responsibil- ity' onto Cheatham, that a commander present with the head of column could have enforced his orders directly, and that Schofield personally led Ruger's division to Stanley's support. The frozen commanders are General Hood and Major General Schofield.

The two families assign responsibility for the missed opportunity differently; both attributions are preserved. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit or blame.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

supportedunresolved The frozen force text reads the IV and XXIII Corps against the Army of Tennessee with no numbers; the live field reads zeros. Cox says Stanley went to Spring Hill with Wagner's division alone, with six batteries under Bridges, that Bradley's brigade was too isolated to hold alone, and that the Confederates were made to believe they faced a superior force. Hood says he crossed Duck River with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps and Johnson's division in light marching order with one battery to a corps, leaving Lee's other two divisions at Columbia.

Formations only; no inspected passage gives numbers for the forces at Spring Hill. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Cox says Bridges placed his guns on a commanding bench just west of the road and Bradley's brigade on a wooded hill three-fourths of a mile east of the turnpike commanding the approaches, and that Cleburne did not seem aware of Bradley's position. Hood says Stewart's corps, sent in the dark to cross the pike, did not reach the position desired.

Ground predates the action; the positions chosen on it were commander decisions and are not tagged.