Cold Harbor VA062

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Lee did not learn of Smith's arrival until the afternoon of June 1, that Meade did not know Kershaw and Anderson's corps were near Hoke, and that it had not been reported the front could be carried by assault. Meade says Sheridan reported himself pressed at Cold Harbor.

Attributed knowledge from an interested history and report; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Smith arrived without his wagons or ammunition and was nearly out of ammunition on June 1, and that in the lines the army had had no vegetables for over a month and bad water. Meade says the White House was now the depot for supplies.

Statements from an interested history and report; no supply return inspected.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says two corps were sent to hold Cold Harbor and attack before the enemy could intrench, that a successful assault would let the army inflict severe loss on Lee crossing the Chickahominy, and that after the failure the aim became detaining Lee's army to aid Hunter.

Stated aims from an interested history.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. NPS says the June 3 assaults were slaughtered at all points; Meade says the Sixth and Eighteenth Corps assaults failed and offensive operations closed about 11 a.m.; Humphreys dates the suspension order to half-past one and says the army remained until the night of June 12.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. Meade's about 11 a.m. and Humphreys' half-past one may describe different events (the end of the assaults and the suspension order); the conflict may be one of reference rather than fact, and neither is adopted.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 15,500 (US 13,000; CS 2,500); the live field reads 18,000 (US 13,000; CS 5,000). Humphreys says the three assaulting corps lost over 4,000 killed and wounded in about an hour on June 3, and over 5,600 including the Fifth and Ninth Corps; for June 1 and 3 he gives 8,411 killed and wounded and 9,948 in all; and he relays Surgeon McParlin's estimate from the Pamunkey crossing to the evening of June 12, 11,729 excluding the Eighteenth Corps plus McParlin's estimated 2,400 for that corps, a grand total of 14,129. For Lee's army he gives the Medical and Surgical History's 1,200 wounded and 500 missing for June 1–12, says the actual number was probably much greater, and estimates four to five thousand for May 27–June 12.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Humphreys' periods (June 3, June 1 and 3, May 27–June 12) overlap and are not additive. McParlin's 14,129 is an estimate running from the Pamunkey crossing, so it also covers the Totopotomoy Creek, Haw's Shop and Old Church intervals (VA057–VA059); it is not assigned to this record.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says Grant decided to make the June 3 attack, that a wrong order from Grant's headquarters cost Smith four or five hours, that Grant told Meade at seven to suspend once success was impossible, that Meade suspended offensive operations at half-past one after Grant's dispatch that the corps commanders were not sanguine, and that Hancock declined to renew the assault. NPS relays Grant's memoir regret. The frozen commanders are Grant, Meade and Lee; the live page lists Grant and 'Major General Robert Lee'.

Decisions attributed as the sources state; no listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen and live force fields read 170,000 (US 108,000; CS 62,000). Humphreys says Smith landed about 12,500 men, left 2,500 with Ames and marched with 10,000 and sixteen guns; that Hoke's division joined Lee with a little less than 6,000 enlisted infantry according to Colonel Walter H. Taylor; and that Wilson was reinforced by 3,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, of which Wilson reported about 1,400 efficient infantry and 1,000 good cavalry.

Partial figures for arriving forces, not matched opening strengths. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Humphreys says the enemy's main line on June 1 was about 1,400 yards away across mostly open ground, that Lee's position was naturally strong on the right and intrenched throughout with open ground in front, that a swamp cut Gibbon's line, and that the Chickahominy was at its lowest. NPS gives a seven-mile front and says Sheridan's troopers relied on repeating carbines and shallow entrenchments on June 1.

Works built during the operations; the ground predates them. Not tagged; no map verification.