Trevilian Station VA099

disputedunresolved Sheridan's June 16 dispatch says that up to that time he could get no definite information of Hunter's position and that report placed him at Staunton; his 1866 report says prisoners taken on the 11th told him Hunter was at or near Lexington instead of coming toward Charlottesville. The dispatch also says prisoners and citizens reported Pickett's division coming. Hampton says he supposed Sheridan would strike Gordonsville and Charlottesville, learned in the night that he had crossed at Carpenter's Ford, and was told of a force in his rear.

Attributed knowledge from interested commanders; no message log inspected. The contemporary dispatch and the 1866 report differ on what Sheridan knew of Hunter and when.

supportedunresolved Sheridan says he lacked ammunition to continue, that his animals were without forage for the two days, that living off the country failed, and that over 500 wounded and about 500 prisoners burdened him; he feared one more engagement would have reduced his ammunition to a very small compass. Hampton cites his men's want of supplies.

Statements from interested commanders; no ordnance or forage return inspected.

supportedunresolved Sheridan says he intended to break the railroad at Trevilian and march on Charlottesville, to unite with Hunter, and apparently also to draw the enemy's cavalry away; Hampton says his design was to strike at Clayton's Store after uniting his divisions, and reads Sheridan's object as Gordonsville, Charlottesville and a junction with Hunter. NPS says the raid aimed to draw off the Confederate cavalry.

Stated or attributed aims from interested commanders and a summary.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory; NPS says it prevented Sheridan from reaching Charlottesville and joining Hunter. Sheridan called the engagement of the 12th the most brilliant of the campaign but says Torbert's fighting made the Mallory's Ford route impossible without another battle; Hampton says the enemy fell back in confusion and that Sheridan was defeated at Trevilian.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 1,600 total; the live field reads 2,078 (US 1,007; CS 1,071). Sheridan's June 16 dispatch gives about 575 killed and wounded (490 wounded) and not over 160 captured, with 20 officers and 500 men taken on the 11th. Hampton gives his own division's loss as 59 killed, 258 wounded and 295 missing (612), and says 570 prisoners were taken and about 125 Union wounded left behind.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Hampton's figure is for his own division only; Fitzhugh Lee's losses are not given.

supportedunresolved Sheridan says he sent Custer by a wood road into the enemy's rear and later directed Torbert's reconnaissance up the Gordonsville road; Hampton says Fitzhugh Lee, by his direction, reinforced Butler with Wickham and struck the Union flank with Lomax, and praises Lee's cooperation. The frozen commanders are Major Generals Sheridan and Hampton; the live page gives Hampton as Lieutenant General.

Directions attributed as stated; the live rank is not adopted. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads Divisions and the live field zero. NPS names Gregg's and Torbert's divisions against Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's. Hampton says he took Lee's division in addition to his own and cites a disparity in numbers in a report covering June 8–24. Sheridan's June 16 dispatch says the enemy was reinforced by infantry during the night of the 11th, and his report says he was led to believe, on information, that the enemy's cavalry was superior in numbers during the whole period it covers.

No counts for the engaged forces; the accounts conflict on relative numbers and on Confederate infantry, and Hampton's and Sheridan's statements on numbers cover periods wider than this record. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Sheridan says the enemy was driven from successive lines of breastworks through an almost impenetrable forest on the 11th, and on the 12th held rifle-pits about 5 miles from Gordonsville; NPS says Hampton and Lee drew a defensive line across the railroad and the Gordonsville road, an advantageous position.

Works built during the engagement; not tagged. No map verification.